This article deals with the effects of the dissemination of confidentiality protecting cryptography on the development of modern democracy. The background for these considerations is the model of a digital information society, characterized by an explosion of functional knowledge in everyday life and by an increasing transfer of central societal functions to electronic networks.
The structural conditions of the virtual world become the structural conditions of our everyday world to the extent that these digitalization processes advance. The promise of a comfortable and costeffective means of access to new communication spheres and interactive and multimedial communication relations as well as the possibility of establishing global links of communication without delay are generally attributed to network communications. Unnoticed by many, these traits have been augmented by a new feature: the opportunity to communicate confidentially and with accountability in open networks such as the Internet. This highlights the main aspect of the topic: electronic cryptography. This technology shall be examined with regard to its effects on modern democracy.
Electronic Cryptography and Its Political Implications
Cryptography can be translated as "encryption" (for further details about cryptology, cf. Müller & Rannenberg, 1999; Wobst, 1998) . The generic term cryptology includes cryptography as the science of encryption and crypto-analysis as the science of browsing and decoding cipher systems. Electronic cryptography is the core technology for data security and data protection and therefore constitutes a central component of the technical infrastructure of information society. Cryptography can be used both in symmetrical and in asymmetrical modes. In symmetrical modes, all communication participants hold identical keys that they can use to encrypt or decrypt messages for each other and even camouflage the existence of respective communication relations. The serious disadvantage of these otherwise quick and effective modes is the required key exchange outside of the network before communication can commence. Asymmetrical encryption obliterates this limitation by employing not identical but complementary key pairs. Its development created the technical prerequisites for widespread use of efficient encryption systems in public networks. The operative principle of asymmetrical encryption is as practical as it is efficient. The private key remains exclusively with its owner, and the public key is published for others to use. Today, this task is generally not performed by end users anymore but by a special intermediate security infrastructure that allocates a person's key to the person and verifies his or her identity by issuing a certificate, among other things. Messages encrypted using a public key can only be deciphered with the corresponding private key, and messages encoded with a private key can only be read using the corresponding public key.
To transmit a message confidentially via the Net, the sender encrypts it with the public key of the recipient. Because only the recipient possesses the corresponding private key that can decode the message, the sender can be assured of sound confidentiality in the transmission process.
The reversal of this procedure permits a digital signature, which can aid to issue and exchange legally binding statements and transactions: To send a message over the Net with accountability, the sender encrypts it before transmission using his or her private key.
1 A message that can be decoded by the recipient using the public key of the sender has necessarily been encoded before with the sender's private key. Therefore, the recipient can be sure that the received message indeed originated from the apparent sender and, if necessary, even prove this before a court of law. Whereas symmetrical key systems do not safeguard against manipulation of messages by legitimate key holders, asymmetrical key systems do offer this protection, because a rightful recipient can only read the message but not alter it.
The use of electronic encryption has never been disputed in its variant of the digital signature-a reason being the manifold hopes connected with such terms as electronic commerce and electronic government, which can only be achieved if legally binding transactions can be accomplished in open networks. Quite a different picture could be painted with regard to confidentiality protecting cryptography. Early on, it already produced a huge quarrel in national and international politics (for further details, cf. Hoffmann, 1995; Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, 1998; Winkel, 1997) . Why, today, is electronic cryptography in its variant of confidentiality protection a politically controversial issue at the level of the international system? Why was it problematic, until the late 1990s, even between nations traditionally maintaining friendly relations such as the United States, France, and Germany? One reason among several is confidentiality protecting cryptography cannot only be used but also abused. On one hand, cryptography offers an effective means to protect information and communication relations of citizens and businesses in electronic networks from the unwanted prying eyes of others. On the other hand, confidentiality protecting cryptography prevents not only illegal interception but also legal wiretapping when official authorities are fighting against criminal and unconstitutional activities. Here, in the virtual world of the networks, interests from otherwise legitimate causes clash with great force, namely the protection of telecommunication confidentiality, data protection, and protection of corporate secrets, on one hand, and maintaining the lawful order of the state, on the other hand.
The dilemma described above was the big issue during the so-called "Cryptographic Policy Debate" (Hoffmann, 1995) , a debate concerning confidentiality protecting cryptography, when bitter discussions raged especially in the United States of the 1990s. The different objects and interests that were contested in this controversy can be elucidated by means of three ideal-typical positions: first, the "liberal" position (release strategy), which has become the dominant cryptologic policy in the transatlantic world including in the United States; second, the restrictive position (prohibition strategy), which today still plays a role in authoritarian states such as the Russian Federation, China, and North Korea; and third, the trusted third party solution (deposit solution), which in the past has been talked about and projected time and again but has never really been installed.
The proponents of the release strategy wanted unrestricted access to confidentiality protecting cryptography to secure individual privacy, to defend the right to freedom of speech in the electronic age, to allow businesses to protect their corporate secrets, and to give exporting businesses the chance to present secure information technology solutions on international markets.
Contrarily, the proponents of a prohibition strategy wanted to restrain dissemination of confidentiality protecting cryptography by means of import and export controls, restrictions of use, or other measures to allow the state and its agencies to remain present in the virtual network world.
The mediating strategy of trusted third parties-in its original form-was intended to keep the attained balance between the conflicting interests in the socalled real world of maintaining the ruling and sanctioning potentials of the state on one hand and granting reliable protection of private and economic secrets on the other hand, thus transferring it to the virtual world of the networks and preserving it for the electronic age. The technical organization of this approach seems very complex: Duplicates of users' keys were supposed to be deposited with the so-called trusted third parties; these would in turn release the keys according to specific procedures on request from legitimate law enforcement authorities for legal surveillance activities. Tracing of the respective communication processes and reconstruction of the key was to be ensured in the variants of key escrow (hardware-based approach) and key recovery (software-based approach) by always adding an identifier to encrypted messages that could be used to determine the corresponding decryption key and its owner when needed.
A trusted third party solution that deserves this name has three prerequisites: First, strong encryption keys must be used; second, the duplicates have to be stored securely at trust centers independent from the state; and third, a legally sound and verifiable procedure for key release must be guaranteed. Until the end of the 1990s, U.S. government policy was nominally based on the trusted third party concept. But it was never quite ready to actually enact the respective stipulations. Washington's key escrow concept did not guarantee the use of strong encryption keys or place the trusted third party organizations outside the realm of the state. Regarding the latter, the databases for the key duplicates (split into separate components) were supposed to be installed within the U.S. Department of Commerce and the U.S. Department of the Treasury.
During the mid-1990s, U.S. policy aimed at transferring this particular solution to the international level. This stance provoked not only massive domestic opposition but even prompted governments of those other countries with generally friendly relations with the United States to reject the idea, even though formerly they had been mostly supportive of the deposit solution. In the end, Washington's opaque crypto-policy helped to drive liberalization of cryptography in Europe.
Modern Democracy Under Procedural, Cultural, and Normative Aspects
To examine whether confidentiality protecting cryptography should be seen more as an opportunity or as a problem for modern democracy may astonish some readers. Most assume that it is an opportunity. The implied reasoning is because electronic encryption permits an effective concealment of information and communication relations from others; it is generally suited to protect free speech. Freedom of speech is generally thought to be a fundamental prerequisite for the operation of meaningful democratic institutions.
On closer scrutiny, however, the situation appears more complicated. The fact that confidentiality protecting cryptography allows for the protection of the right to freedom of speech is not sufficient evidence in and of itself to categorize it as an overall benefit for democratic society. Democracy means more than freedom of speech alone. Apart from the right to freedom of speech, democracy assumes a system of rules and sanctioning mechanisms that lead free speech into constructive avenues of political activity. This system of rules and sanctioning mechanisms also ensures that the value consensus on which democratic society stands will remain.
According to German democratic theorist Ernst Fraenkel (1968) , the process of forming political opinions can be divided into three phases (ideal types). The first phase is the information phase, during which individuals obtain political and politically relevant impulses and materials. The second phase is the discourse phase, when the political agenda is shaped through the articulation of various competing interests. The third phase is the decision phase, in which, mostly by way of elections but occasionally by deciding on substantive questions, the process of shaping political opinions is completed. Where the prerequisites for this process are absent, society can neither relate its various interests rationally and formulate a political agenda nor arrive at results adequate to existing problems that are acceptable to the different stakeholders.
The significance of maintaining the value consensus that constitutes democratic society culturally should not be underestimated. German history illustrates that a democratic system is not durable if its social-psychological prerequisite cannot be found in a vital political culture rooted in deep respect for human dignity. The incapacity of the Weimar Republic to defend democratic values against the attacks of its adversaries, as a result of the absence of these cultural foundations, was one of the central causes for its collapse.
German democratic theorist Herrmann Heller (1934) helped explore this problem. Heller analyzed Europe's problems as Europe came increasingly into the grip of fascism. He highlighted two equally important aspects of democratic regimes: Democracy not only requires a degree of freedom but a corresponding degree of control. Both of these dimensions of democWinkel / ELECTRONIC CRYPTOGRAPHY 187 racy must be intact if it is to prevail. The effect of disturbances in the balance of these two aspects can be summarized into this short formula: Too much state control leads to impairment of civil liberties but eventually also undermines state control; too much liberalism first leads to impairment of state control but then also undermines civil liberties.
Far from being Heller's original contribution, the balance of freedom and control is as old as the theories of democracy and the state. At first, this balance was being discussed primarily in the context of debates about the legitimacy of the democratic state. No one has expressed this basic dilemma of communal life more fittingly than the Frenchman Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1762) in the introductory sentences of his Social Contract. There, he argued, "Man is born free; and everywhere he is in chains. . . . How did this change come about? I do not know. What can make it legitimate? That question I think I can answer" (p. 1). What Rousseau wanted to express with these words is this: The nature of the human race is founded in human beings'freedom. But at the same time, humans depend on living in communities with other people, where all enter into social relations that cause restrictions of freedom and mandate the creation of a ruling authority-thus the establishment of state control. In this context, Rousseau tried to construct a specific societal contract in the center of which stands the Volonté Général, in search for a balance between these two aspects of social existence.
The question of the legitimate balance between individual freedom and the state's claim to control has occupied many great thinkers of the Enlightenment besides Rousseau, among them the British contract theorists Thomas Hobbes (1651) and John Locke (1689). John Locke added very pragmatic considerations to his studies of the legitimacy problem. He outlined how a political community (or the structure of a state) can provide a balanced correlation between individual freedom rights and the ruling and sanctioning authority of the state for the longest possible time. Via John Locke, this road leads to the Frenchman Charles Louis de Montesquieu (1748) , who conceived the basic institutional elements of modern democracy by developing Locke's ideas into his model of separation of power and branches of government.
To this day, the separation and combination of legislative, executive, and judicial powers serve that function in all modern democracies. It keeps the state strong enough to maintain the order among its citizenry and protect them from external hazards, and it prevents the state from restricting citizens' liberties illegitimately. This balance has facilitated the establishment of durable democratic institutions in western societies. These strong democratic institutions are the outcome of a complex system of checks and balances, which evolved over time according to the ideas of Locke and Montesquieu. They in turn allow for the balancing of civil liberties and the state's claim to control, even when historical circumstances change.
Democracy and Cryptography
The question about the expected effects of the different approaches to cryptography in view of the development of the democratic system in the electronic age commands an answer that differentiates between both dimensions (freedom and control). Therefore, the options mentioned at the beginningthat is, general release, general prohibition, and trusted third party key strategies-will be related step by step to the aspects of modern democracy mentioned thereafter and evaluated with regard to respective chances and risks.
Modern Democracy and the Prohibition Strategy
As for the option of a rigorous restriction of confidentiality protecting cryptography, that is, cryptoprohibition, the necessary assessment is obvious. A general prohibition dissolving the conflict between the individual's claim to freedom rights and the state's claim to control in the virtual world of the networks leaving only the state a single-sided benefit could of course not be combined with the constitutional premises of modern democracies. This would open the doors to fulfilling George Orwell's vision of a merciless surveillance society, because society is increasingly digitalized, and communications more often become electronically mediated communication relations that can be intercepted, recorded, and analyzed by others.
Another objection is the possibility for effective noncompliance with such a general prohibition. Because of the global scope of the networks and different technical options to bypass restrictions, contesting users could effectively ignore a general prohibition of cryptography. This would mostly shield law-abiding citizens from the use of encryption, much less crimi-nals and enemies of the Constitution. Overall, this objection gives reason to the satisfying conviction that such a strategy has hardly had any chance in most countries.
A final objection to such a policy might be that it would prevent the realization of the promise of digital communication because in the absence of privacy guarantees few would be tempted to use electronic networks.
Modern Democracy and the Trusted Third Party Solution
The trusted third party solution has been discredited as a result of the nebulous crypto-political path the U.S. government took during the 1990s. Many observers place this approach on the same level with the rigid regulations of the prohibition strategy. When taking a closer look, such a view seems unwarranted. The balance between individual freedom rights and the state's demand for control has been achieved in modern society through a sophisticated system of rules and reciprocal control mechanisms. Key deposit with a trusted third party represents the wish to preserve this balance for the electronic age in agreement with the Montesquieu tradition. (This is the strength of key deposit that embodies its right to persist.) From the point of view of liberal democratic theory, this policy thus represents the ideal solution. However, there are manifold practical problems with the trusted third party solution. Some experts regard the establishment and the upkeep of the required immense infrastructure an unrealistic endeavor. It is furthermore unclear whether the key deposit concept can really aid the authorities in safeguarding the scope of their fight against criminal and unconstitutional activities during the technical transformation. Both the prohibition strategy and trusted third party solution unrealistically assume that organized criminal networks and unconstitutional organizations will abandon complete and thorough encryption. (This would shift the relation of expense and returns of such a strategy toward severely burdening the returns.) In other words, the effectiveness of either of these strategies is questionable at best.
The trusted third party solution does not appear to offer a workable policy on encryption. This approach may be appealing from the point of view of democratic theory, but it suffers from substantial practical problems.
Modern Democracy and the Release Strategy
Not only can the general release and dissemination of confidentiality protecting cryptography be effective in the protection of individual privacy in an increasingly virtualized world, it can even be refined. For the first time in the history of the protection of privacy, citizens would have the opportunity to use their own means to secure the protection of telecommunication confidentiality. Would their access to encryption be denied, under the changed socio-technical circumstances of digital information society, this could lead to breaches of secrets and surveillance activities of a magnitude hitherto unknown.
One cannot, however, repudiate the objections of those who complain that a full-scale dissemination of confidentiality protecting cryptography would render ineffective an important means of combating criminal and unconstitutional activities and thereby an important means of guarding against assaults on the value systems of modern democracy. It has long been proven that criminals and enemies of the Constitution were among the first to use the advantages of modern encryption technology. There are numerous indications that during the transition of modern society to the electronic age, new forms of crimes are being developed. Not only new crimes such as electronic money laundering, electronic gambling, or blackmailing but also new forms of terrorist attacks and acts of sabotage such as introducing viruses, worms, or bombs into the information systems of businesses and the government are on the increase.
In a network with high societal relevance but no official sanctions, there could well arise impairments and deformations of political processes. Not only are there no methods to prevent sexist, anti-Semitic, or other racist messages from being digitally transmitted, there are no means of countering them by refutation and/or prosecution. Moreover, organizations could rise that work for specific interest groups-as "virtual mercenaries," so to speak-to silence politically disliked voices by sabotaging their technical systems or blocking their network access with spam. They could do this unidentified and unpunished because of the absence of a ruling or sanctioning authority. Use of electronic cryptography can thus not only undermine systems of regulation and sanctioning mechanisms but also undermine the basic values of democratic societies. The ability of certain interests to silence their opponents could furthermore undermine one of the Winkel / ELECTRONIC CRYPTOGRAPHY 189 key prerequisites of democratic governance: the right to freedom of speech.
It cannot be denied that the implementation of the release strategy, which especially since the cryptopolitical reorientation of the U.S. government has good chances to become international standard, entails the smallest technical and organizational effort and suggests an easy road to secure international telecommunications. But it also unlocks serious problems concerning the future of democratic political systems and political cultures. For the development of modern democracy, it is not the best but merely the least undesirable solution.
Conclusions and Final Contemplations
The fact that a general prohibition of cryptography has no chance of being accepted on the international level should be welcomed from the point of view of democratic theory.
However, the impracticality of the trusted third party solution is highly disturbing. It suggests that the system of checks and balances, which has maintained the balance between freedom and control in most modern democracies, (probably) cannot be applied to the virtual network world.
The option of a general release, which will (in all likelihood) be established as the international standard, represents a suboptimal solution from the point of view of democratic theory. It creates serious problems, which are just beginning to emerge but will become more apparent during the growing transition to a digital information society. As long as confidentiality protecting cryptography is not abused to block Internet access of dissenters by unidentifiable spamming or to conceal any acts of sabotage, it principally protects free speech. Nevertheless, by opening the door to these types of abuses, it creates potential problems that should not be underestimated. These problems have to be dealt with intensively and without delay.
The Need for Action in Politics and Society
Concerning the need for action in politics and society, the following conclusion can be drawn from the described considerations: On one hand, the original aim, to structure the virtual Internet world to conform to democratic principles, should be maintained. Different forms of cooperation between countries, international organizations, players in civil society, and businesses could be practical instruments here. However, they are controversial and their success remains uncertain.
3 On the other hand, the integration of network communications into the regulatory framework of societal communication is necessary to compensate for the specific disadvantages and problems of the virtual world. This will probably lead to the (partial) disappointment of the hopes associated with interactive network communications these days, which are being expressed in catchwords such as electronic democracy and electronic governance.
In view of the problems caused by electronic cryptography and despite increasing societal demands for new forms of political control and participation, it seems reasonable to be cautious about the transfer of conventional political procedures onto electronic networks. A learning process in terms of trial and error is preferable at any rate to precipitated action. The further complementation of conventional procedures of information gathering, political discourse, and political decisions by presentation of official documents on the Internet, the introduction of virtual discussion groups, and the realization of information technologysupported elections could be the heart of such a process. The societal phase, in which substantial parts of the process of shaping political opinions will have been transferred onto networks, should be only the very last stage of this learning process.
The Yield for Social Sciences
The discussion within the social sciences about the democratic potentials of the new information technologies (for further details, cf. Winkel, 2001) , which is taking place among political scientists and public relations experts among others, has largely left out the question of confidentiality protecting cryptography. The dominant positions in this discussion acknowledge opportunities mostly for political information and political discourse and less for the mechanisms of political decision making.
According to numerous authors, network communications are able to achieve principal significance for political information if general access to the new communication spheres can be provided. As for political discourse, it is stated that even today there is plenty of applications in the area of civil politics and that this tendency is probably going to endure and even possibly spill over to well-established areas of political life, resulting in lasting changes. On the other hand, there is great skepticism concerning the proposals to transfer procedures of democratic decision making onto the networks. Elections conducted digitally may not meet the requirements of general, direct, free, equal, and secret elections.
Nevertheless, this picture changes in many ways when combined with aspects of cryptography and the corresponding contexts of data protection and data security. Even from this new perspective, network communications have the chance to gain central significance on the level of political information. But broad general access to the new technologies is not sufficient. There must also be the possibility to communicate confidentially and, if needed, anonymously to prevent interception of political document exchanges, creation of user profiles about political preferences, and/or exclusion or discipline of users with disliked political attitudes.
On the level of political discourse, perspectives for the future are not as favorable. Discourses are dependent on certain rules and structures, which can only be defined by contents and not technically. Therefore, in an environment of complex open networks where every participant is able to effectively conceal his or her information and communication relations from others, nobody is in a position to manage such rules and structures.
Electronic elections, an innovation in the sphere of political decision making and therefore applicable to representative democracies, seem to be feasible as a result of the new encryption technologies. When used in its variant of the digital signature, these technologies can provide for matching, integer, and genuine votes, and in its variant of confidentiality protecting, encryption can even ensure confidentiality of the ballot. The same technical infrastructure used to conduct electronic elections could also be used to conduct electronic plebiscites. The inclusion of electronic plebiscites in the systems of representative democracy would alter modern democracy far more than electronic elections, as they would draw into question not the primacy of representative opinion making but its monopoly.
Notes
1. However, in actual uses not the message itself is encrypted but a short version that is calculated with a particular method. The resulting data constitute the electronic signature in connection with additional data (especially the name of the sender).
2. At the same time, it poses substantial requirements on the constitution of a state. Even in the Federal Republic of Germany, the first constitutional state that has been functioning on German soil for a long period of time, such a concept could not be realized without further effort. It would necessitate a revision of the surveillance rights of secret services (e.g., the G 10 law), as these currently obstruct an adequate and transparent regulation of the procedures to release key duplicates (for further details, cf. Winkel, 1997) .
3. Voluntary self-regulation is increasingly being fashioned as a central element in the fight against criminal and unconstitutional contents (see especially Waltermann & Machill, 2001 ). This is quite understandable when looking at the deficient state regulations. But when also taking into account the disillusioning experiences gained in other contexts (especially in the area of television), such a reorientation can also be interpreted as an expression of helplessness.
